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When the United Nations (U.N.) was formed in 1945, its main
task was "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war."'
Under the shadow of the Second World War, this meant halting
military aggression between combative states and their neighbors.
War, within living memory and for most of the twentieth century, was
waged by states, and the concept of "security" was a matter of inter-
state relations. States, for their part, were the privileged actors on the
world stage. International law was focused on interstate relations and
was employed to shield states by guaranteeing their privileges and
immunities. In fact, if properly named, the United Nations should
have been termed "the United States," but that label was already
taken.
In the Westphalian system of states, "national security" meant that
the state itself had to be secured by rendering its sovereignty and
territory untouchable. The idea of "collective security" upon which
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the United Nations was founded signaled a willingness by states to
pledge that military aggression against one would be viewed as
aggression against all and thus bring on the collective response of the
United Nations. As Professor Andrew Mack, Director of the
University of British Columbia's Human Security Centre, showed in
his groundbreaking study, the incidence of international wars
dramatically declined beginning in the 1980s. 2 Between 1816 and
2002, the study counted 199 international wars, including wars of
colonial conquest and decolonization. As "the anti-colonial struggles
and ... the conflicts related to the Cold War came to an end, the total
number of international wars declined both absolutely and
relatively." 3 The number of ongoing wars fell from about five in 1987
to two in 2000, and the number of civil wars fell from over fifty in
1990 to around thirty in 2000.4 This decline resulted from an increase
in the number of democratic states, growing economic
interdependence, and a decline in the economic utility of wars.
5
Significantly, growth of international institutions, such as the United
Nations, also contributed to the decline. The durability of this decline
remains to be seen.
While Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations prohibits
the use of force by one state against another, Article 51 recognizes the
right of self-defense in response to an armed attack.6 In addition to
Article 51, Chapter VII of the Charter leaves another option for
overriding sovereignty through diplomatic, economic, and military
actions in response to threats to international peace and security.
7
During the Cold War, state sovereignty remained well-entrenched and
was challenged only rarely and then under special circumstances
associated with anti-colonial and anti-apartheid struggles. The
2. HUMAN SEC. CTR., HUMAN SECURITY REPORT 2005: WAR AND PEACE IN
THE 21ST CENTURY (2005), available at http://www.humansecurityreport.info/
content/view/28/63.
3. Id. at 148.
4. Id. at 148-49.
5. The Secretary-General, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility:
Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 1-16,
delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004) [hereinafter A
More Secure World], available at http://www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf.
6. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4, art. 51.
7. Id. arts. 39-51.
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Security Council's resolutions under Chapter VII slowly grew from
feeble protests against continued Portuguese colonialism and Southern
Rhodesia's declaration of independence to the imposition of an arms
embargo against the South African apartheid regime.
A more radical challenge to an immutable view of sovereignty,
the notion of humanitarian intervention, emerged only in the post-
Cold War era. In the early and mid-1990s, as several civil wars with
genocidal and ethnic cleansing aims flared up, the limits placed by
Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter on domestic jurisdiction 8 were
questioned and urgent calls were made to invoke Chapter VII, which
authorizes the Security Council to override the privilege of
sovereignty. 9 The Council, in fact, invoked Chapter VII in response to
the collapse of the Somali state, again to address the humanitarian
crisis in Bosnia, and finally, to provide protection and humanitarian
assistance in Rwanda. Though the Security Council excused its
actions by pointing to unique, and therefore non-precedent forming,
circumstances in each case, it justified its actions by referring to a
loosely-articulated threat these conflicts posed to international security
and peace. The U.N.'s resolutions "appear to suggest the halting
emergence of a generally accepted norm that permits intervention in
the event of grievous lapses in the protection of human beings."' 0
While the state has historically been the object secured in
international relations, elements of an alternative approach focused on
the protection of the individual have begun to make an appearance.
Starting in the nineteenth century, these efforts were concentrated
around attempts to guarantee the protection of special categories of
individuals. The efforts focused on the treatment of aliens, the
abolition of slave trade, the establishment of common employment
conditions, and the protection of minorities. 1 An inclusive language
of human rights for the universal protection of individuals had to wait,
8. Id. art. 2, para. 7.
9. Id. arts. 39-51.
10. S. NEIL MACFARLANE & YUEN FOONG KHONG, HUMAN SECURITY AND THE
UN: A CRITICAL HISTORY 176 (2006).
11. Gershon Shafir, Citizenship and Human Rights in an Era of Globalization,
in PEOPLE OUT OF PLACE: GLOBALIZATION, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE CITIZENSHIP
GAP 18-19 (Alison Brysk & Gershon Shafir eds., 2004).
2007]
3
Shafir: Legal and Institutional Responses to Contemporary Global Threats:
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2007
4 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38
however, until after the Second World War.' 2 And, even during the
forty-five years of the Cold War, human rights were selectively and
unevenly enforced.
It was only in the past two decades or so that the notion of
security itself evolved to accommodate the new thinking. The
understanding of security, as S. Neil MacFarlane and Yuen Foong
Khong pointed out, has expanded in two new directions.
1 3
Horizontally, security came to encompass, in addition to military
concerns, economic, environmental, and cultural security concerns as
well. Vertically, the focus on a state's national security was being
complemented by attention to the needs of individual human beings. 14
The new thinking was accompanied by a new language organized
around the core goal of "human security." Human security was
conceived in its first formulation by the U.N. Development
Programme in 1994 as a combination of two dimensions: freedom
from fear and freedom from want, though the solution to the latter-
sustainable development-was viewed as the foundation for the
former. 15 In the report's words, "[w]ithout peace, there may be no
development. But without development, peace is threatened."'1
6
Indeed, the 1994 Human Development Report proposed that a global
human security fund be established to address common threats. 17 This
original idea was accompanied by another principled innovation. The
1994 Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict proposed,
and Kofi Annan adopted, the idea of moving the United Nations "from
a 'culture of reaction to a culture of prevention."' 1 8 Out of this idea
arose the broader notion of the "responsibility to protect" vulnerable
populations.' 9 Even so, the Security Council refused to authorize
NATO's intervention in Kosovo, and the Ottawa Treaty on the Ban on
12. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter Universal
Declaration of Human Rights].
13. MACFARLANE & KHONG, supra note 10, at 1-2.
14. Id.
15. U.N. Development Programme, Human Development Report: 1994 (1994).
16. Id. at iii.
17. Id. at 6.
18. MACFARLANE & KHONG, supra note 10, at 153.
19. Id. at 177-81.
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Land Mines was adopted outside the U.N. Conference on
Disarmament. These examples point to the limits on the U.N.'s
capacity to put this vision into effect.
These developments-the new practices and thinking that
provided their foundations and justification in the optimistic mood of
the post-Cold War 1990s-have produced expectations for continued
measurable progress. These expectations were articulated in the
ambitious "United Nations Millennium Declaration" and the
"Millennium Development Goals" adopted by the General Assembly
in a meeting of world leaders on September 8, 2000.20 The
Declaration set specific goals in a wide range of categories, from
"Peace, Security and Disarmament," through "Development and
Poverty Eradication," "Protecting our Common Environment,"
"Human Rights, Democracy and Good Governance," "Protecting the
Vulnerable," and "Meeting the Special Needs of Africa," to
"Strengthening the United Nations."21 The document that formed the
basis of the joint California Western School of Law-Institute for
International, Comparative, and Area Studies lecture series in 2006-
2007, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility,22 was
prepared for the 2005 World Summit, which was billed as the largest
gathering of world leaders. The Summit was organized in order to
review the Millennium Goals' Implementation.
A More Secure World was prepared by a "High-level Panel on
Threats, Challenges, and Change" appointed by Kofi Annan, the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, and represents Annan's
legacy to the body he led for eight years. The panel consisted of
sixteen distinguished members. The Chair of the panel was Anand
Panyarachun, the former Prime Minister of Thailand, and some of the
other dignitaries included Gro Harlem Brundtland, former Prime
Minister of Norway, Gareth Evans, President of the International
Crisis Group, Amre Mussa, Secretary General of the Arab League,
Sadako Ogata, former U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees,
Yevgeny Primakov, former Prime Minister of the Russian Federation,
and Brent Scowcroft, the former U.S. National Security Advisor.
20. U.N. Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, 8th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/Res/55/2 (Sept. 8, 2000).
21. Id.
22. A More Secure World, supra note 5.
2007]
5
Shafir: Legal and Institutional Responses to Contemporary Global Threats:
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2007
6 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38
The report's most notable contributions and recommendations fall
within three areas. First, in stark contrast to traditional conceptions of
security, the panel offered a broader conception within which it
recognized six clusters of threats.2 3 These clusters of threats are the
focus of the four articles in this issue of the California Western
International Law Journal. Second, the panel sought to make more
consistent the criteria for the use of force by the Security Council
under Chapter VII, by suggesting that it satisfy tough criteria of both
legality and legitimacy.24 Finally, the panel recommended that the
United Nations be made more representative by expanding the
Security Council.25 Neither the second nor the third group of
recommendations was adopted.
In view of the changes that have taken place in international
relations since 1945, and in particular in the wake of the Cold War,
the panel made the case for a new view of collective security. The
three premises on which its recommendations rest are that
contemporary threats faced by humanity "recognize no national
boundaries," that no individual state, however powerful, "can by its
own efforts alone make itself invulnerable," and that, in the report's
cautious language, there are states that are unable or unwilling "to
meet ... the responsibility to protect [their] own peoples and not to
harm [their] neighbors., 26 These characteristics gave rise to the six
clusters of threats identified by the panel.
(1) Poverty, infectious disease, and environmental
degradation:
This part of the report not only presents dreadful statistics on loss
of life, lopsided economic inequality, and life expectancy that deserve
attention on their own right, but also ties them together in a novel
fashion, namely in stating that these humanitarian calamities also pose
a threat to security. In so doing, the notion of security itself is
redefined.
The purpose of this formulation is to bridge the two schools of
human security already mentioned: protection from violence and
sustainable development. Canada, in particular, played an important
23. Id. at 11-13.
24. Id. 1 185-209.
25. Id. at 6.
26. Id. at 11.
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role in arguing for and sponsoring resolutions for the purpose of
protecting civilians, especially women and children, in civil wars.
Japan, limited by its constitution from engaging in military actions
abroad, found its niche in advancing development-related plans. It has
been argued, in particular by those who come out of the traditional
"security" framework, that the concept of human security has been
stretched too far to be useful, and it would best be limited to the
protection of vulnerable populations, non-combatants, women, and
children from organized, that is man-made, violence. In this view,
characterizing economic, health, environmental, and related socio-
economic concerns as security issues is ill-advised since it leads to the
loss of analytic traction.27 Indeed, in comparison with the discussion
offered in the other five threat clusters, this chapter proceeds in a
somewhat haphazard fashion. But whether "human security" is an ill-
defined grab-all threat category or not, its wide use and appeal drives
home the vast difference in the concerns raised in the developed and
the developing parts of the world.
The human security argument adopted by the panel is as follows:
if we plot the relation between poverty and civil war, we find that a
per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of $3,000 predicts a three
percent probability for the onset of a civil war within five years,
whereas a per capita GDP of about $100 raises the probability to
twelve percent. 28 Thus, poverty, added on top of ethnic or regional
inequalities, is likely to further compound the grievances that lead to
civil wars.29 Though not explicitly spelled out, various forms of
environmental degradation, loss of arable land, water scarcity,
deforestation, and climate change, in the panel's view, should also be
factored in with security considerations. And while the panel does not
link the scourge of HIV/AIDS to security per se, it points to the
successful efforts of global institutions, in particular the World Health
Organization, in limiting the spread of Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome.3 °
The panel's main recommendations to tackle the threats clustered
under this heading are to reduce poverty in accordance with the
27. MACFARLANE & KHONG, supra note 10, at 264.
28. A More Secure World, supra note 5, [ 22, fig. II.
29. Id. [ 22-23.
30. See id. 51.
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Millennium Development Goals, reschedule international debt,
conclude the Doha trade talks by 2006, adopt a long-term strategy for
reducing global warning beyond the period covered by the Kyoto
Protocol, increase resources devoted to combating HIV/AIDS (but
also to develop long-term strategies for diminishing its threat), and
rebuild local and national public health systems in the developing
world. 31
Doctor Thomas Novotny's essay analyzes the last challenge in a
comprehensive fashion. Novotny reiterates the effects of
globalization on health concerns and presents the multiple actors,
including private-public partnerships, of the global health community.
In particular, he highlights several new areas of thinking and
institution-building in this community. Novotny observes the limited
legal powers of the World Health Organization and focuses on two
novel or revised binding legal mechanisms-International Health
Regulations and the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control-
that seek to enhance compliance.32  He highlights the growing
understanding of health as part and parcel of the broader human
security paradigm, and the ensuing focus on social determinants of
health that fall outside the health sector itself. Novotny then goes
beyond the panel's recommendations with his wholly original
discussion of the emerging field of health diplomacy.
(2) The threat of international conflict:
Though, as we have seen, there has been a noticeable reduction in
the incidence of inter-state wars, unresolved regional disputes in South
Asia, North-East Asia, and the Middle East continue simmering and
occasionally break out into armed conflict. Since the end of the Cold
War, the Security Council has played a greater role in addressing
international threats. In fact, while it imposed sanctions only twice
before 1989, it has done so fourteen times since then in order to
reverse aggression, combat terrorism, protect human rights, support
peace agreements, and restore democratic governments. Significantly,
the Council invoked its authority under Chapter VII on several
occasions and though "[c]olectively authorized use of force may not
31. Id. 59, 62-63, 67-68, 72.
32. Thomas E. Novotny, Global Governance and Public Health Security in the
21st Century, 38 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 19 (2007).
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be the rule today ... it is no longer an exception." 33 Humanitarian
interventions are significant because they tend to circumvent state
sovereignty, represent a collective effort at establishing security, and
strengthen the influence of international institutions.
Since addressing international and internal wars requires similar
measures, the panel lumped together its recommendations for these
two threats, and they will be examined jointly at the end of the next
section.
(3) The threat of intra-state conflict:
Civil wars are also occurring with less frequency than they were
two decades ago, and the United Nations provides greater leadership
in this area, though its mediation efforts produced settlements in only
a quarter of civil wars and an even smaller share of negotiated
agreements were successfully implemented. 34  The panel mentions
wistfully, but not necessarily with a clear conscience, that "[i]f the
Security Council had been seriously committed to consolidating peace
in Afghanistan in the early 1990s, more lives could have been saved,
the Taliban might never have come to power and Al Qaida could have
been deprived of its most important sanctuary." 35 The panel considers
the most egregious failures of the United Nations in regard to civil
violence to have been its inability to halt ethnic cleansing and
genocide in Rwanda, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo.
36
The panel's main legal recommendations for preventing war and
armed conflict are as follows: "more attention to developing
international regimes and norms to govern some of the sources and
accelerators of conflict," as well as regional frameworks for the
protection of minorities and democratically-elected governments;
better management of natural resources (such as conflict diamonds);
and, on the institutional side, having the Security Council refer cases
of mounting conflict to the International Criminal Court; establishing
a facility for training U.N. mediators, and making use of preventive
deployment of peacekeepers.37
33. A More Secure World, supra note 5, 81.
34. Id. 86.
35. Id.
36. Id. 89.
37. Id. q1 89-106.
2007]
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As part of its discussion of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, and
reflecting on the humanitarian disasters in Somalia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Rwanda, and Kosovo, and the unfolding tragedy in
Darfur, thepanel made another suggestion-though one that fell short
of a recommendation. However, its words are worth quoting at
length:
There is a growing recognition that the issue is not the "right to
intervene" of any State, but the "responsibility to protect" of every
State when it comes to people suffering from avoidable catastrophe
... . And there is a growing acceptance that while sovereign
Governments have the primary responsibility to protect their own
citizens from such catastrophes, when they are unable or unwilling
to do so that responsibility; should be taken up by the wider
international community .... 38
The panel endorsed "the emerging norm that there is a collective
international responsibility to protect"39 in the event of genocide or
ethnic cleansing, and this responsibility is to be exercised through the
authorized use of military force by the Security Council as a last
resort.4°
Professor Mary Ellen O'Connell's paper is focused on the
preservation of peace from the legal and normative perspective.
O'Connell explores the debate between the perspectives of political
scientist Hans Morgenthau and realist diplomat George Kennan on the
one hand and legal theorists and philosophers H.L.A. Hart, Louis
Henkin, and Thomas Franck on the other to assess the range of
established legal criteria for the exercise of the right of self-defense
under international law. O'Connell sides with the latter's emphasis on
the validity of international law even in the absence of enforcement,
citing favorably the 1986 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar.
v. U.S.) International Court of Justice ruling, which holds that armed
self-defense may be undertaken only in response to acts that "amount
to armed attacks."'4 1 This approach is more radical than that taken by
38. Id. 201.
39. Id. [203.
40. Id.
41. Mary Ellen O'Connell, Preserving the Peace: The Continuing Ban on War
Between States, 38 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 41, 46-47 (2007).
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the panel, which interprets Article 51 of the U.N. Charter to mean that
"a threatened State, according to long established international law,
can take military action as long as the threatened attack is imminent,
no other means would deflect it and the action is proportionate.
' 'a2
(4) The threat of nuclear, radiological, chemical, and biological
weapons:
The panel points out that the very effective Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), under which the number of
states with known nuclear arsenals rose from four at the time of
signing in 1963 to only eight in 2004, is now under a great deal of
stress. 43 The NPT regime is under threat by states that do not comply
with its obligations or that threaten to withdraw from them.an In
addition, the large stockpiles of nuclear, and the more readily-
available radiological materials, are not adequately safeguarded and,
in fact, states have publicly admitted to twenty cases of nuclear
material diversion and more than 200 cases of illegal trafficking of
such materials have been documented.45  States with chemical
weapons have fallen behind in their commitments to destroy them and
biological agents, such as toxin ricin, have been discovered in several
terrorist sites.4 6
The panel recommends that the demand for these materials be
reduced by calling on nuclear states to disarm, not threatening non-
nuclear states with nuclear retaliation, and agreeing to nuclear-
weapon-free zones in the Middle East and South Asia. a7 The supply
of such materials should be reduced by adopting the more stringent
standards of the NPT's Model Additional Protocol for inspection and
verification, and "the Security Council should be prepared to act in
cases of serious concern over non-compliance with non-proliferation
and safeguards standards.,4 8
Larry Johnson's article provides a succinct but thorough survey of
the differences among the way nuclear, chemical, and biological
42. A More Secure World, supra note 5, 1 188.
43. Id. [ 107-12.
44. Id. I 111.
45. Id. 112.
46. Id. 115.
47. Id. 124.
48. Id. 129.
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weapons are regulated by existing treaties.4 9 In particular, Johnson
shows how the provisions of the NPT divide states into distinct
groups: the five original members of the nuclear club (all permanent
members of the Security Council), the three countries that did not sign
the NPT and developed such weapons-India, Pakistan, and Israel, the
states without such weapons, many of which received help from the
International Atomic Energy Agency in developing nuclear energy for
peaceful uses, and the two countries-North Korea and Iran-that
violated the treaty.
(5) The threat of terrorism:
The panel indicated that the threat posed by contemporary
terrorism contains two new dimensions. These dimensions are the
global network capacity of Al-Qaida, which allowed it to attack more
than ten U.N. member states on four continents in the five years after
2001, and its desire to cause mass casualties. 50  The panel
recommended the development of a comprehensive strategy
addressing the root causes of terrorism while also strengthening state
capacities and anti-terrorism instruments, education for tolerance, and
the rule of law and human rights.51 But the most compelling aspect of
the panel's work in the area of prevention was its ability to come up
with what had eluded other attempts-a definition of terrorism that
will provide moral authority and undermine the justification for
terrorism "even for the most defensible of causes., 52 In the panel's
words, terrorism is
any action. .. that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm
to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such act, by its
nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a
Government or an international organization to do or to abstain
from doing any act.
53
49. Larry D. Johnson, Protecting the World from Weapons of Mass
Destruction: Reflections on the High-level Panel Report on Threats, Challenges and
Change, 38 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 65 (2007).
50. A More Secure World, supra note 5, 146.
51. Id. In 147-48.
52. Id. 1164.
53. Id.
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The panel, in short, highlighted the main characteristics of an act
that defines it as terrorism-attacking civilians and non-combatants.54
Simultaneously, the panel brushed aside the two most common
objections to an agreed-upon definition by holding that violent acts
committed by states against civilians are already strongly regulated by
international humanitarian law and asserting that not even occupation
"justifies the targeting and killing of civilians., 55
Todd Landman's comparative study of American and British legal
and practical responses to global terrorism goes beyond this part of the
report but shares the panel's attempt to standardize the criteria for
legitimate responses.56 Landman examines the two countries' legal
standards and policies in light of the imminence of the threat and the
proportionality of counter-terrorism measures under existing
international and regional human rights standards in order to clarify
the trade-offs between the protection of civil liberties and the risks to
national security.
5 7
(6) The threat of transnational organized crime:
The panel holds that transnational organized crime, like poverty,
infectious disease, and environmental degradation, poses serious
threats to international peace and security since corruption, illicit
trade, and money-laundering contribute to state weakness, impede
economic growth, and undermine democracy. 58  Contemporary
organized crime operates through fluid and inter-connected networks.
In fact, a network of networks, more agile than earlier transnational
crime, has developed whereas information-sharing and cooperation
among state agencies remains cumbersome. Consequently, such
crime's single largest source of income-drug trafficking-has
expanded and compounded other threats. 59 For example, "[t]here is
growing evidence of a nexus between terrorist groups' financing and
54. Id.
55. Id. 160.
56. Todd Landman, Imminence and Proportionality: The U.S. and U.K.
Responses to Global Terrorism, 38 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 75 (2007). See also A More
Secure World, supra note 5, 207.
57. Landman, supra note 56.
58. A More Secure World, supra note 5, [ 23.
59. Id. T 166.
20071
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opium profits, most visibly in Afghanistan." 60 Among the panel's
main recommendations are the adoption of a convention on money-
laundering and the establishment of a central authority for exchange of
evidence among states.
61
Kofi Annan reworked and combined the recommendations of the
High-level Panel with the plan for the implementation of the
Millennium Development Goals by 2015 to produce his own report
entitled In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security, and
Human Rights for All, for the 2005 World Summit. 62 Annan reiterates
the value of the new paradigm of human security that was born in the
bosom of the United Nations in the mid-1990s for highlighting the
interconnectedness and global character of contemporary threats.
Annan argues that "we will not enjoy development without security,
we will not enjoy security without development, and we will not enjoy
either without respect for human rights." 63 In particular he holds that
the Panel's vision of "a more comprehensive concept of collective
security ... [C]an bridge the gap between divergent views of security
and give us the guidance we need to face today's dilemmas.
64
In Larger Freedom was further revised and distilled during six
months of negotiations into a "Draft Outcome Document" submitted
to the General Assembly by its President in early August 2006 in
preparation for the September 14-16 World Summit. The pre-
summit negotiations on the outcome document were, however, thrown
sharply off-course by the recess appointment by President George W.
Bush of John R. Bolton, a well-known critic of the United Nations and
multilateralism, as U.N. Ambassador. Bolton immediately proposed
hundreds of revisions to the draft that would have removed the words
"Millennium Development Goals," and, while affirming many of the
60. Id.
61. Id. 173-74.
62. The Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development,
Security and Human Rights for All, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc.
A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005).
63. Id. [ 17.
64. Id. 77.
65. Revised Draft Outcome Document of the High-level Plenary Meeting of
the General Assembly of September 2005 Submitted by the President of the General
Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/59/HLPM/CRP. 1/Rev.2 (Aug. 5, 2005) [hereinafter Revised
Draft Outcome Document].
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principles contained in the document, he would have deleted
references to their implementation, targets, and timetables. 66  For
example, while Bolton retained Article 48 (Article 72 in the adopted
Summit Outcome document; Resolution 60/1 of the General
Assembly), which recognizes that "development, peace, security and
human rights are mutually reinforcing," he insisted on deleting Article
49, which stated:
We resolve to take concerted action, through such a system of
collective security, based on the United Nations Charter and respect
for international law, so as to prevent, mitigate and remove threats
to international peace and security, respond effectively to natural
disasters, ensure economic development and the full enjoyment of
human rights for all States and peoples.
67
When it seemed that the summit would collapse, and even close
U.S. allies such as the United Kingdom "expressed dismay over the
scope and direction of the Bolton amendments and his approach,
68
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice instructed Bolton to temper his
polemic, and an outcome resolution was eventually adopted. But, as a
New York Times op/ed concluded "[b]y the time Washington
retreated to a more realistic position, it was too late to retrieve much
of the bold agenda .... Indeed, the term "human security" is never
affirmed in the resolution. Rather, it makes its appearance as part of a
vague promise to continue "discussing and defining the notion of
human security in the General Assembly. ,70
To assess the legacy of the High-level Panel Report, I will focus
on the way its recommendations in regard to three security threats-
66. Letter from John R. Bolton, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, to
Kofi Annan, Secretary-General, United Nations (Aug. 30, 2005), available at
www.reformtheun.org/index.php?module=uploads&func=download&fileld=813.
67. Revised Draft Outcome Document, supra note 65, 48-49; 2005 World
Summit Outcome Document, 72, G.A. Res. 60/1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24,
2005) [hereinafter 2005 World Summit].
68. Howard LaFranchi, At U.N., Bolton Softens His Tone, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Sept. 12, 2005, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/
09/12/world/printable835261.shtml.
69. Op-Ed, The Lost U.N. Summit Meeting, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2005, at
A28.
70. 2005 World Summit, supra note 67, 143.
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terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and the "responsibility to protect"-
were treated in the 2005 Summit Outcome Resolution.7'
The most novel aspect of the response to terrorism recommended
by the panel was an agreed-upon definition of terrorism that would
eliminate the moral equivocation in regard to attacks on civilians and
non-combatants. This definition made its way into the draft summit
outcome document, but it does not appear in the final summit outcome
resolution. The opposition to the definition has come mainly from
Middle Eastern countries, but it also seems that the United States was
unwilling to throw its weight behind this proposal. Though the
summit adopted a resolution "to conclude a comprehensive
convention on international terrorism ' 73 during the 2005 and 2006
session of the General Assembly, Bolton suggested the deletion of the
proviso to include "a legal definition of terrorist acts .. ..7 The loss
of this definition cost the United States a major moral victory and a
practical tool that would have made cooperation against terrorism
more justifiable and effective.
The Summit Outcome resolution also lacks an entire section that
appeared in the draft, the response to the threat of nuclear, chemical,
and biological weapons.75 Larry Johnson's very plausible explanation
is that the United States objected to the inclusion of a call for steps to
be taken by nuclear weapons countries to "restart disarmament," an
obligation that appears in the original NPT.76 The U.S. objection,
namely that it had reduced its stockpiles after the end of the Cold War
and that the international security climate must improve before
disarmament is put back on the table, carries considerable weight.
However, giving up on the agreed-upon U.N. resolution on non-
proliferation at the time when Iran is suspected of trying to develop
just such weapons, looks particularly short-sighted. It is very likely
that if the United States would not have fought the summit resolutions
on so many distinct fronts, it could have secured a less committal
71. See generally id.
72. Revised Draft Outcome Document, supra note 65, 65.
73. Id. T 66.
74. Id.
75. Id. [ 57-62.
76. Johnson, supra note 49.
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resolution on disarmament while still having a clearer one on non-
proliferation.
Finally, let us turn to one of the significant innovations of the
summit: its adoption of the principle of "responsibility to protect"
(R2P) populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and
crimes against humanity. 7 The final outcome resolution includes the
language Bolton sought to expunge, namely a commitment that
member states "are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and
decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the
Charter, including Chapter VII" should such circumstances emerge,
though this commitment is watered down by the added caveat "on a
case-by-case basis . *...78 Even so, while the willingness to use
powers granted under Chapter VII weakens the immunities of state
sovereignty and offers a novel and broader version of mutual
responsibility and collective security, the fact is that the spirit of the
1990s in which "humanitarian intervention" was undertaken on
several occasions seems to have come and gone. Samantha Power,
the author of the famed A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of
Genocide, summed up the changing climate: "Humanitarian
intervention-the nonconsensual use of force-is dead. It had a very
short life-September 1995 to the summer of 2003-and it's been
killed for the next decade. America is the only power that can do it
and, after Iraq, we would just be recruiting fodder for this apocalyptic
nihilism.",79  The repeated failure of the United Nations and the
international community to take more decisive action to stop the
spiraling ethnic cleansing and genocide in Darfur is sad proof of
Power's pessimistic assessment and of the transformation of the
"responsibility to protect" into a dead letter.
It remains to be seen whether the progress towards a more secure
world made through the articulation and attempted enforcement of
human security and the responsibility to protect in the 1990s will
continue in the era of the "war on terror," or whether its
accomplishments and legacy will remain in suspension. We might
find solace in remembering that the principles of the Universal
77. 2005 World Summit, supra note 67, 138.
78. Id. 139.
79. Roger Cohen, Of Sarajevo and Baghdad, INT'L HERALD TRIB., June 24,
2007, available at http://www.iht.com/bin/print.php?id=6299408.
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Declaration of Human Rights,8 ° drafted in 1949 just as the Cold War
broke out in full force, began to bear fruit in the cracks of that era.
For example, the Helsinki Agreement 8' was not fully implemented
until the end of the Cold War. The fact that most post-1945 human
rights legislation lay in abeyance for two generations only to reemerge
in a more auspicious time shows the resilience and longevity of
powerful ideas.
80. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 12.
81. Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(Helsinki Agreement), Aug. 1, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1314.
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